Video: Afghan Election in Jeopardy
The closely-watched runoff election in Afghanistan appears to be in jeopardy as the challenger to the incumbent president is signaling that he may call for a boycott at the polls. Mandy Clark reports.
Doug Bandow: Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan
Candidate Barack Obama was widely seen as running on a peace platform. More recently President Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for supposedly offering a new international approach. Yet he is considering a major military escalation in Afghanistan.
Instead, the president should rethink Washington’s objective. The conflict has become his war. He should not ask, is Afghanistan winnable? Rather, the right question is what should the U.S. attempt to achieve? The goal should be to advance American security, not build an Afghan state.
The president need not rush his decision. Hawkish demagogues who entrapped the U.S. in an unnecessary war in Iraq hope to do the same in Afghanistan. For instance, Rep. Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyoming) claimed: “the lack of decisiveness about how to best proceed is emboldening our enemies and endangering our troops and friends.” The worst policy, however, would be to mimic the foolish decisiveness of President George W. Bush.
Afghanistan was President Bush’s “good war,” in which Washington ousted the ruling Taliban for hosting al-Qaeda. But he quickly lost interest in Afghanistan, shifting Washington’s attention and resources to Iraq. Conflict in Afghanistan has raged for eight years–longer than the U.S. spent fighting World Wars I and II combined–consuming nearly 900 U.S. and 600 allied lives, as well as $220 billion. The Afghan people, too, have suffered greatly.
Yet “victory” looks ever more distant. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that the situation in Afghanistan is “deteriorating.” The government barely functions; drug money pervades the otherwise moribund economy. The number of estimated insurgents, Taliban attacks, and allied casualties all are rising. Barely a third of the territory can be said to be under the central government’s (very loose) control, and even large urban areas are no longer safe. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s supporters engaged in ostentatious and widespread electoral fraud.
Indeed, the election imbroglio highlights the administration’s challenge. White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel declared: “The result, for us and for the president, is whether, in fact, there’s a credible government and a legitimate process.” But that question has been answered–in the negative. The initial vote was marred by widespread irregularities; the fraudulently reelected president accepted a run-off only because the foreign military powers keeping him in power demanded one; no one imagines President Karzai losing even if Abdullah Abdullah reverses his decision to boycott the poll. A forced coalition/national unity government would offer little more legitimacy.
President Obama termed the war one of “necessity” and in March added 21,000 combat troops to the 47,000 Americans already stationed in Afghanistan. (Another 37,000 allied, largely NATO, forces are on station, though often where they are not needed.) Now the president’s hand-picked commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, is pushing for upwards of 80,000 more personnel, with 40,000 apparently the “minimum” acceptable in his view.
The administration is worried about the political implications of escalation and is considering a compromise–adding some troops, but fewer than desired by Gen. McChrystal. However, pursuing expansive objectives without providing the necessary resources would be the worst policy. Commented Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson: “This game’s been going on for eight years. It’s time to raise or fold.”
But raising would not guarantee success. The allies initially deployed 60,000 personnel in Bosnia, a much smaller territory in which conflict had ceased. At its maximum Russia had 118,000 troops in Afghanistan, which proved to be too few. Even an extra 80,000 troops–which the U.S. does not have handy to deploy in Afghanistan–would not be enough. Under traditional counterinsurgency doctrine, Afghanistan, with 33 million people, many of them living in remote villages amidst rugged terrain, warrants 660,000 allied personnel. Nor is NATO reinforcement a realistic option. President Obama, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and Gen. McChrystal all have pushed for more assistance, but garnered few commitments and even fewer boots on the ground. Europeans have far less stomach for continuing the war than do Americans.
The critical issue is Washington’s objective. The U.S. long ago achieved its goal of displacing and weakening al-Qaeda (despite the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden) and ousting the Taliban government which gave the organization refuge. That success persists despite recent Taliban gains. National Security Adviser James Jones estimated fewer than 100 al-Qaeda members are operating in Afghanistan, and said they have “no bases, no ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies.”
Ousting the Taliban was simple compared to creating “an effective and representative government,” in the words of Marin Strmecki, formerly at the Pentagon, or “a national representative government that is able to govern, defend, and sustain itself,” according to four scholars at the Center for American Progress, or “a credible Afghan partner for this process that can provide the security and the type of services that the Afghan people need,” in Rahm Emanuel’s words. Such a partner doesn’t currently exist and is no where close to existing.
Everyone uses the old adage that Afghanistan is the “graveyard of empires,” but outside powers never have had much success in imposing their will on the Afghan people. Nation-building is difficult enough: only in Germany and Japan, with ordered societies and democratic traditions, has the U.S. had unambiguous success. Third World states have proved largely impervious to Western attentions.
Afghanistan is no different. Afghanistan “worked” during the mid-20th century under a monarchy which understood the limits of its power. The regime respected the poor, traditional, autonomous tribal-based society which it purportedly ruled. And, most important, there were no foreign military occupiers.
Social engineering by Washington would be difficult in the best of circumstances. Afghanistan’s challenges are daunting. Observed the Economist magazine: “The country’s mountains and deserts are forbidding; its tribal make-up bewildering; and, after three decades of war, its communities broken, poor and ignorant. Well-meant actions often have unintended effects: fighting can create more insurgents than it kills; foreigners are blamed for attacks that hurt Afghan civilians; and schemes to win people over can deepen antagonism.”
Afghanistan hosts 20 ethnic groups. Even the Pashtuns are divided into 50 tribes. This is not a society traditionally welcoming to outsiders, let alone foreigners. Afghanistan has become the world’s largest opium producer. Finally, Afghan society has been badly deformed by three decades of war.
After eight years, Washington has not created the answer in Kabul. Matthew Hoh, a former Marine Corps officer who recently resigned from the State Department, explained: “Like the Soviets, we continue to secure and bolster a failing state, while encouraging an ideology and system of government unknown and unwanted by its people.” Ralph Peters, a columnist who backed the Iraq war, criticized protecting “an Afghan government the people despise.”
The inadequacies of the Karzai regime are manifest and multiple. The International Crisis Group pointed to “a highly centralized constitutional order in which the legislature has been denied the tools to check an overbearing executive, and a neglected judiciary, which contributes to the climate of impunity and corruption fuelling the insurgency.” Malalai Joya, vilified by fundamentalists for daring to run for parliament and promote women’s rights, complained: “Your governments have replaced the fundamentalist rule of the Taliban with another fundamentalist regime of warlords.”
Then there is the recent flagrant election fraud, which, wrote Hoh, “will call into question worldwide our government’s military, economic and diplomatic support for an invalid and illegitimate Afghan government.” Karzai’s allies claim that the Afghan president has learned from the experience, but what has he learned? If he can get away with rampant fraud, whether or not a second poll is held, he likely will become even less tractable. U.S. escalation will be seen as support for the existing regime, not for the sort of idealized system Washington claims to support.
No intrinsic strategic importance justifies attempting to construct a genuine Afghan state. Boston University’s Andrew Bacevich explained: “No serious person thinks that Afghanistan–remote, impoverished, barely qualifying as a nation-state–seriously matters to the United States.” Afghanistan’s importance primarily derives from its impact on nuclear-armed Pakistan, whose largely ungoverned border territories provide a haven for both Taliban forces and what remains of al-Qaeda.
Blogger Paul Mirengoff contended that “Ceding Afghanistan to [America's main] enemy would have serious adverse implications for Pakistan.” The Washington Post worried: “success by the [Taliban] movement in toppling the government of either country would be a catastrophe for the interests of the United States and major allies such as India.” Others predict a veritable regional disaster if the U.S. withdraws.
However, a semi-stable, semi-workable Afghan state doesn’t necessarily work to Pakistan’s advantage. First, how would it affect Islamabad’s most serious security concern–the regional balance with India? Pakistan strongly supported the Taliban regime pre-9/11 for a reason. Second, Afghans enjoying the benefits of peace might not welcome jihadists and
terrorists, encouraging the latter to remain in Pakistan’s largely autonomous border provinces.
Most important, Pakistan seems more likely to be destabilized by an endless, escalating conflict than a Taliban advance. Islamabad’s vulnerabilities are obvious, with a weak civilian government facing a complex mix of poverty, instability, insurgency, and terrorism.
Unfortunately, the war in neighboring Afghanistan exacerbates all of these problems. Argued Hoh: “Our presence in Afghanistan has only increased destabilization and insurgency in Pakistan.” First, the war has pushed Afghan insurgents across the border. Second, cooperation with unpopular U.S. policy has reinforced the Zardari government’s appearance as an American toady. Ever-rising American demands further undercut Pakistani sovereignty and increase public hostility.
From Pakistan’s perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to “victory,” whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation’s strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling.
Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: “Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist.” The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: “To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake.”
Washington is left with only bad options. One is to continue trying to “fix” Afghanistan. Gen. Stanley McChrystal argued: “A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sighted strategy.” Moreover, said Gen. McChrystal, American strategy must “earn the support of the people,” which will win the war “regardless of how many militants are killed or captured.”
Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations even suggested that “Poor governance is an argument for, not against, a troop surge. Only by sending more personnel, military and civilian, can President Obama improve the Afghan government’s performance, reverse the Taliban’s gains and prevent al-Qaeda’s allies from regaining the ground they lost after 9/11.” In short, failing to create a functional state after eight years of war means Washington should double down, pushing more lives and money into the growing pot.
America’s well-disciplined and well-trained forces can do much, but not everything. Hoh observed that no “military force has ever been tasked with such a complex, opaque and Sisyphean mission as the U.S. military has received in Afghanistan.” Even if better deployed in more heavily populated areas, the odds of reasonable success in reasonable time at reasonable cost seem long at best.
The point is not that the majority of Afghans love the Taliban. But many dislike the Karzai government, local warlords, and/or allied forces. The costs of “winning” such a complicated game almost certainly would outweigh the benefits of even the most optimistic projections. As Peters bluntly states, “the hearts and minds of the Afghans not only can’t be won, but aren’t worth winning.” More likely than victory would be years of war, persistent insurgent activity, thousands more American casualties, hundreds of billions of dollars more outlays, persistent regional instability, and ultimate U.S. withdrawal.
What are the alternatives? The status quo offers little hope of reversing the Taliban’s gains. Concentrating allied troops in the cities might offer greater urban security but would concede most of the country to the insurgency. Accelerating training and equipping of the Afghan army and police would yield positive results only if the resulting forces proved to be competent and honest, as well as competently and honestly led.
The better policy would be for Washington to begin drawing down its combat forces. The outcome might be Taliban conquest and rule, but equally likely is continuing conflict and divided governance amongst competing political factions, ethnic groups, and tribes. The resulting patchwork would be tragic, but the fighting would no longer be inflamed by outside intervention.
Would adverse consequences extend beyond the region? The Economist hyperbolically fears that “defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it more open to attacks.” However, jihadists are most likely to attack Westerners when their grievances are ongoing. Groups based in Amman, London, Madrid, and Riyadh as well as America are more likely to act if the American government is killing more rather than fewer Muslims in Afghanistan.
Moreover, escalation, followed by additional years of conflict and then ultimate defeat would multiply the harm to America’s reputation. The Soviet Union made this mistake. Author Victor Sebestyen reviewed the minutes of meetings between Politburo and military officials and reported: “The Soviets saw withdrawal as potentially fatal to their prestige in the cold war, so they became mired deeper and deeper in their failed occupation.” Even reformist Mikhail Gorbachev dithered out of fear of the impact on Moscow’s image before finally withdrawing Soviet forces in 1989.
The most serious argument against withdrawal is that al-Qaeda would gain additional “safe havens.” Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute argued that “Afghanistan is not now a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, but it would likely become one again if we abandoned it.” Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration’s special envoy to South Asia, contended: “without any shadow of a doubt, al-Qaeda would move back into Afghanistan, set up a larger presence, recruit more people and pursue its objectives against the United States even more aggressively.” Preventing this is “the only justification for what we’re doing,” he insisted.
Yet there is no evidence that al-Qaeda has moved into territory currently governed by the Taliban. Even Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would not be a genuine safe haven. Noted Stephen Walt of the Kennedy School: “The Taliban will not be able to protect [bin Laden] from U.S. commandos, cruise missiles and armed drones. He and his henchmen will always have to stay in hiding, which is why even an outright Taliban victory will not enhance their position very much.”
Indeed, anti-terrorism expert Marc Sageman observed in recent congressional testimony: “there is no reason for al-Qaeda to return to Afghanistan. It seems safer in Pakistan at the moment.” Other options include other failed or semi-failed states, such as Somalia and Yemen. The defuse jihadist movement which has organized most of the terrorist plots since 9/11 has found adequate safe havens even in Europe.
No wonder Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations admitted, while calling for continuing “a war effort that is costly, risky and worth waging–but only barely so,” that preventing al-Qaeda from moving back into Afghanistan was “the weakest argument for waging the kind of war we are now waging.” The U.S. doesn’t have the resources necessary to wage war everywhere terrorists might conceivably seek a safe haven and need not do so in any case.
The administration should adjust its policy ends. Washington’s principal objective
should be protecting U.S. security. The Washington Post’s David Ignatius railed against adopting “a more selfish counterterrorism strategy that drops the rebuilding part and seeks to assassinate America’s enemies.” But the U.S. government’s overriding obligation is to protect U.S. citizens, and that means focusing on al-Qaeda rather than the Taliban, forestalling and disrupting terrorist operations against America. Doing so requires sharing intelligence widely among affected nations, squeezing terrorist funding networks, utilizing Special Forces on the ground, employing predator and air strikes–judiciously, given the tragic risk of civilian casualties, which both raises moral issues and fuels anti-American sentiment–and cooperating with various Afghan forces and the Pakistani government.
In contrast, it is not necessary to build a functional state in Kabul allied with the U.S. Noted Sageman: “The proposed counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan is at present irrelevant to the goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda, which is located in Pakistan. None of the plots in the West has any connection to any Afghan insurgent group, labeled under the umbrella name ‘Afghan Taliban’.” In Afghanistan Washington should tolerate any regime or group, or combination of regimes or groups, willing to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks.
Obviously, policymakers disagree on the likelihood of success of such a political strategy. One unnamed anti-terrorism official told the Washington Post that the prospects of political reconciliation are “dim and grim.” Other analysts contend that only major battlefield victories would encourage Taliban forces to surrender.
Yet history suggests that accommodation is possible and certainly worth pursuing. After all, the Karzai government has made deals with warlords and narcotics producers alike. Washington once worked, reluctantly to be sure, with the Taliban regime to combat drug production. There are indications that the Taliban was angered by al-Qaeda’s 9/11 assault on the U.S. Moreover, a number of Taliban commanders defected in the early years after American intervention.
Thus, Washington should attempt to split the Afghan insurgency. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once equated al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but more recently admitted: “Not every Taliban is an extremist ally.” In fact, the Taliban mixes hard-core militants and disaffected residents. Arsalan Rahmani, once Islamic affairs minister in the Taliban government and now a member of the Afghan parliament, explained: “Some are fighting to go to paradise, but among the Taliban leaders most want peace. Afghanistan is their homeland and they want peace here.”
The distinction is widely recognized. Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria wrote: “It is unclear how many Taliban fighters believe in a global jihadist ideology, but most U.S. commanders with whom I’ve spoken feel that the number is less than 30 percent. The other 70 percent are driven by money, gangland peer pressure or opposition to Karzai.” Similarly, the Boston Globe quoted an American intelligence official who contended that only ten percent of insurgents were Taliban ideologues, while “Ninety percent is a tribal, localized insurgency.”
Even Gen. McChrystal advocated going “pretty high up” to give even Taliban commanders “the opportunity to come in.” He added that Pashtuns “have always been willing to change positions, change sides. I don’t think much of the Taliban are ideologically driven; I think they are practically driven. I’m not sure they wouldn’t flip to our side.”
Washington will need to display both knowledge and nuance, admittedly too often in short supply, to exploit Taliban differences. However, being out of power apparently has left the Taliban even less well-disposed to bin Laden & Co. Explained John Mueller of Ohio State University: “There are reports that Omar’s group has made clear its rupture with al-Qaeda in talks with Saudi Arabia”
Thus, the Taliban may well focus on its own interests. Mullah Mutawakkil, once a minister in the Taliban government, believes a deal is possible: remove bounties on commanders, release insurgent prisoners held at Bagram air base, and accept Taliban rule in Afghanistan’s southern provinces in return for a commitment not to allow use of Taliban-controlled territory in attacks on the West.
This would not be a radical policy, since Washington already has ceded certain areas to warlord control. Insurgent leaders know well that denial is less costly than control: Washington could launch targeted strikes against any al-Qaeda operations and oust any regime, Taliban or other, which allied itself with terrorists. This approach also would demonstrate to the Muslim world that the U.S. is targeting terrorists, not Islamic governments. In contrast, warns Mutawakkil: “If the Taliban fight on and finally became Afghanistan’s government with the help of al-Qaeda, it would then be very difficult to separate them.”
Currently joined with the Taliban are opportunistic warlords such as Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Washington should appeal to differences among uneasy allies and offer to buy off–or lease–the more venal opposition.
An essential aspect of this strategy, however, is withdrawing allied troops, since many Afghan fighters are determined to resist any foreign occupiers. A continuing occupation, no matter how well-intentioned from our perspective, will generate “more casualties, irritation and recruitment for the Taliban,” in the words of Nicholas Kristof.
In fact, the longer more U.S. forces remain, the harder more insurgents will resist. In 2007, for instance, 27 often feuding groups coalesced in Pakistan in response to U.S. airstrikes. In Afghanistan the population has not turned on the Taliban the way Iraqis turned on the al-Qaeda. Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis, who served in both Afghanistan and Iraq, advocated a U.S. withdrawal over the next 18 months: “Many experts in and from Afghanistan warn that our presence over the past eight years has already hardened a meaningful percentage of the population into viewing the United States as an army of occupation which should be opposed and resisted.”
Unfortunately, there are limits to Washington’s ability to ameliorate this result. Argued Hugh Gusterson, of George Mason University: “The Pentagon will try to minimize the insult through cultural sensitivity training and new doctrines that emphasize befriending the locals, but they will fail because it’s in the very nature of counterinsurgency that occupying forces must be intrusive to be effective. And when you have thousands of foreign troops being shot at, accidents and atrocities happen. The more such troops you have, the more accidents and atrocities you get.”
There remains the emotional case for escalation. Army Sgt. Teresa Coble complained to the Washington Times: “We would not be honoring the lives of the troops who died if we left here without finishing our mission.” But what is the mission? One should mourn those whose lives were sacrificed by their government for any policy which failed. However, al-Qaeda has been largely defanged. The failure to create an Afghan nation is one of policy, not personnel. It would not honor American servicemen and women to needlessly toss away even more lives to continue this failed policy.
It would be especially foolish to embark upon a campaign of escalation if it is not sustainable over the long-term. And escalation is not. After nearly eight years of war, the American people are losing faith–not in the necessity of killing or capturing terrorists, but in the dream of remaking Afghanistan. The latest CNN poll indicates that six of ten Americans oppose sending more troops to Afghanistan. Nearly half want to reduce manpower levels or even withdraw all troops. A majority also believes that Afghanistan has turned into another Vietnam.
Advocates of years more of costly war for dubious gain argue that the public should support their policy, but that is irrelevant. The president must base U.S. policy on what the public likely will support. Else his strategy will be doomed from the start.
In 2002 Barack Obama warned against fighting a war “without a clear rationale and without strong international support,” and that an invasion of Iraq would yield: “a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, and with unintended consequences.” That is happening in Afghanistan. In fact, one could imagine bin Laden hoping to ensnare the U.S. in a no-win war in Afghanistan. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki of the Rand Corporation noted that “combat operations in Muslim societies” are “likely to increase terrorist recruitment.” Indeed, parody has become truth. “Reported” the Onion: “According to sources at the Pentagon, American quagmire-building efforts continued apace in Afghanistan this week, as the geographically rugged, politically unstable region remained ungovernable, death tolls continued to rise, and the grim military campaign persisted as hopelessly as ever.”
Of course, the desire of many Washington policymakers to improve the lives of Afghans is genuine. Most Afghans want peace and many Afghans desire American aid to better their land. Given enough resources and time, courageous and dedicated U.S. personnel could conceivably succeed in remaking Afghanistan. But the chances are slim while the cost in lives and treasure inevitably would be high–too high.
Getting out of Afghanistan won’t be as easy as getting in. The administration should develop a strategy to steadily reduce rather than increase America’s military presence. Combat forces should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. should focus on counter-terrorism. The time and manner of getting out should reflect potentially changing circumstances. But withdrawal should be Washington’s ultimate objective.
An independent America was born of a rugged determination by common folk to govern themselves. It should not surprise modern Americans that many Afghans feel the same way. Despite the persistent delusion in Washington that the rest of world desperately desires to become America’s next attempt at social engineering, most Afghans are not waiting for U.S. advisers, diplomats, and soldiers to show them a better way. To the contrary, many are ready to fight to follow their own way.
Their determination presents the president with a momentous decision. The administration should narrow the Afghan mission. Washington’s objective should be disrupting al-Qaeda wherever located, whether Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere. On occasion that will warrant military action, but more often other tools will be required. Even with the finest military on earth the U.S. government cannot do everything. Reconsidering American strategy in Afghanistan is an important way for Washington policymakers to acknowledge the limits of U.S. power. Changing American priorities in this way would be a giant step by President Obama towards actually earning a Nobel award bestowed more out of future hope than past achievement.
More on Barack Obama
Tom Gregory: America: One Tick Closer to God
My partner, David Bohnett and I sponsored the Wednesday afternoon White House reception honoring President Obama’s signing of the Hate Crimes Bill. The crowd was a noble and dignified collection of invincible fighters. GLSEN’s executive director Dr. Eliza Byard was there. So were the Shepards, James Byrd’s proud sisters, and those who have learned the hard way that anger and hate are the ugly antithesis of anything Jesus, Mohammad, G*d, Buddha, or any other religious leader ever would want for their flock.
Unless you’ve lived in a box, you’re aware the Hate Crimes Bill was bogged down in committee and Congress throughout the Bush years. It’s hard to imagine a more hateful time in America than those Bush years. The anger was enervating, the vitriol was exhausting, and the overall tone of right wing rhetoric was un-American and backward. Finally, for the first time in over a decade with the swing of a pen, President Obama turned his back on the right wing’s ridiculous rhetoric by doing the right thing.
The old law defined a “hate crime” as one motivated by religion, race, national origin, or color. The new hate crimes act expands the federal definition of hate crimes to include assaults based on sexual orientation, gender, disability or gender identity. The lion’s share of the law states:
“Whoever . . . willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person . . . [shall be liable for criminal penalties stated in this legislation].”
Appended to the hate crimes amendment was a statement ensuring that a religious leader or any other person cannot be prosecuted on the bases if his or her speech, beliefs, or association. In other words, if a person peaches against homosexuality, people of color, or any group — and a listener goes out and commits a lynching, the speaker cannot be held responsible.
According to 2006 FBI statistics, hate crimes based on sexual orientation constituted the third highest category reported and made up 15.5 percent of all reported hate crimes. Only race-based and religion-based crimes (almost all anti-Semitic) were more prevalent than hate crimes based on sexual orientation. Now all three of these categories of Americans are protected under this legislation.
Of course Pat Robertson bellowed his gloom and doom saying that America’s religious rights are threatened and inferring that America is run by a bunch of liberals who want to lead the United States to the burnished gates of hell. It’s his usual brand of bitter loathing and fear that has made him very rich and powerful. But he’s even protected under this law.
America is not further from God by Obama’s signing of this bill. We are one step closer to being a more embracing nation that leaves any final judgment up to the Almighty. By professing a stronger legislative distain for hate we are honoring God’s love, power, and delight for all of us.
During Obama’s East Room speech, I was standing in the front row. There among the disabled, the black, the Jewish,the Muslim, the Native American, the Christian, and the disenfranchised, I was not looking at our President, but watching Judy Shepard. It’s impossible to imagine what she went through when she received the news of her son’s assault. Matthew Shepard had been beaten so brutally that his face was covered in blood, except where it had been partially washed clean by his tears. But now a mother’s pain was right in front of me, the ripples of that brutal murder welling out of her eyes. She wasn’t crying because America was going down some fear monger’s road to hell, but simply because she had brutally lost her son, and finally through her steadfast efforts, his death was not in vain.
Her tenacity is America. That’s what we must mark as true. We cannot surrender to turmoil and heartache, but get up, find peace in doing, and make tomorrow a better day.
Judy, Dennis, and Logan Shepard fought hard for Wednesday, Matt would be very proud. They’re American heroes. I’ll take their lead over the naysayers any day. Bravo America, continue the evolution.
More on Ted Kennedy
Presidential PDA Past And Present: The Kissing Couples Who Came Before The Obamas (PHOTOS, POLL)
Sunday’s New York Times Magazine cover story “The First Marriage” takes a close look at the Obama union. Washington correspondent Jodi Kantor writes:
[T]he Obamas mix politics and romance in a way that no first couple quite have before. Almost 10 months ago, they swept into Washington with inauguration festivities that struck distinctly wedding-like notes: he strode down an aisle and took a vow, she wore a long white dress, the youthful-looking couple swayed to a love song in a ceremonial first dance and then settled into a new house. Since then, photograph after official White House photograph has shown the Obamas gazing into each other’s eyes while performing one or another official function.
And you can see all of that lovey dovey-ness HERE, on our Obama Big News page. But how do other presidential marriages stack up? Check out a slideshow we originally posted last Valentine’s Day, and tell us which first marriage seemed to have crazy amounts of chemistry, and who looked pretty tame.
Who Is The Ultimate Game Changer In Style? VOTE NOW!
And follow HuffPost Style on Twitter and become a fan of HuffPost Style on Facebookwhile you’re at it.
Afghan challenger won’t participate in runoff if his conditions aren’t met
President Karzai has rejected most of Abdullah’s demands. The standoff comes as Obama mulls sending more troops.
Reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan — Former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah will not participate in next week’s presidential election runoff unless incumbent Hamid Karzai meets his demands for a credible vote, a senior campaign official said today.
Geoffrey Dunn: ‘Going Rouge’ Skewers Palin
In what is surely a brilliant bit of counter-insurgency marketing, OR Books will be releasing the political antidote to Sarah Palin’s memoir Going Rogue with Going Rouge–Sarah Palin, An American Nightmare, on November 16, the day before Palin’s tome explodes on the national book market.
Although it’s been billed by some right-wing commentators as a “copycat publication” intended to “confuse readers,” Going Rouge will not be appearing in bookstores and will be available only on the OR website.
Edited by Richard Kim and Betsy Reed of The Nation, Going Rouge contains a superb collection of more than 50 short articles on Palin by an all-star array of political writers who skewered Palin during her vice-presidential candidacy last fall. Many of the classic pieces written about Palin in the last year are collected in the volume–including “Wrong Woman, Wrong Message,” by Gloria Steinem, and “Our Polar Bears, Ourselves,” by Mark Hertsgaard.
Going Rouge is an engaging read from start to finish. In their introduction, Kim and Reed rightfully acknowledge the “vital place” that Palin currently occupies “in the Republican Party’s zeitgeist.” In spite of her loss last fall on the Republican ticket and her endless series of car crashes on the campaign trail, Palin remains in the words of New York Times columnist Frank Rich not only the GOP’s “biggest star and most charismatic television performer; she is its only star and charismatic performer.” No one was talking this past week about paying Mitt Romney or Mike Huckabee $100,000 to come to Iowa.
If you’ve followed Palin’s career closely, as I have, most of the essays here will be familiar, though I somehow managed to miss Robert Reich’s powerful excoriation of Palin’s “death panel” hysteria in response to Obama’s proposed health-care reforms.
One of the reasons that Palin was selected as John McCain’s running mate, of course, was as a calculated attempt by his campaign to wrest women voters (read Hillary Clinton supporters) away from the Democratic Party ticket. In the end it proved to be a strategy as ridiculous as it was misguided. Perhaps the most compelling sections in Going Rouge are those that address feminist considerations magnified (and distorted) by Palin’s candidacy. It includes splendid pieces by the likes of Steinem, Katha Pollitt, Jessica Valenti, Amy Alexander, Linda Hirshman, Amanda Fortini, Rebecca Traister, Michelle Goldberg, Emily Bazelon and Dahlia Lithwick–all of whom shed considerable light on the varied and complex nuances of gender and feminist constructions raised by the Palin phenomenon.
Traister, a contributor to Salon who has a book coming out next fall about women in the 2008 campaign entitled Big Girls Don’t Cry, was by far the best–and most consistent–feminist critic of Palin throughout the campaign. In “The Sarah Palin Pity Party,” Traister writes, “I guess I’m one cold dame, because while Palin provokes many unpleasant emotions in me, I just can’t seem to summon pity, affection or remorse.”
Going Rouge is not all slash-and-burn. There’s plenty of humor contained throughout. In a section entitled “The Poetry of Sarah Palin,” Palin’s peculiar phrasing and word amalgamations are placed in poetic form:
Haiku
These corporations.
Today it was AIG,
Important call, there.
Max Blumenthal, author of the fascinating Republican Gomorrah, is also here in all his splendor, with an account of Palin’s witch-hunting pastor from Kenya, Thomas Muthee, “who urges his parishioners to crush ‘the python spirit’ of the unbeliever enemies by stomping on their necks.”
While two of Alaska’s best known bloggers (and HuffPo contributors) Jeanne Devon (AKMuckraker) and Shannyn Moore are included in the collection (Devon thoughtfully explains the brutal ironies of Palin using the term “rogue” in the title of her book), the Last Frontier gets more than a bit short shrifted in Going Rouge, and that’s too bad.
There’s little mention of Palin’s role as a council member and mayor of Wasilla, her brutal firing of Police Chief Irl Stambaugh and her betrayal of political allies from the early days of her career. I also would have liked to have seen some excerpts from the Branchflower Report included in the collection along with a run-down of the nearly 20 ethics complaints that are tidily posted on the pages of the Anchorage Daily News. While Palin is now an American icon, she is also very much a product of longstanding Alaskan political traditions of isolation and corruption, and her current political traction remains linked to the interplay between those forces.
Then, too, are Palin’s strange post-election relationships with the likes of Greta Van Susteren, John Coales and Fred Malek–all of whom go unmentioned in the collection. But these are minor rubs.
One thing is certain: You will read far more about the real Sarah Palin in Going Rouge than you ever will in her own memoirs, being published by (who else?) Rupert Murdoch. If there is a single consistency in the Palin canon it is that she is an inveterate liar and motivated by a reckless ambition that has left a trail of collateral damage from Wasilla to Washington, D.C. Going Rouge is full of golden nuggets about Sarah Palin. Judging from her past performances, her own book will most certainly be riddled with deceit.
GOING ROUGE: Sarah Palin–An American Nightmare
Edited by Richard Kim and Betsy Reed; OR Books
Publication: November 16th, 2009
$16 paperback; $10 e-book; 336 pp.
Award-winning writer and filmmaker Geoffrey Dunn is at work on a book about Sarah Palin and American politics, to be published by Macmillan/St. Martin’s next year.
More on Sarah Palin
Honduras leader could be restored
U.S. efforts bring a deal meant to end the crisis gripping Honduras.In the end, it took direct, explicit U.S. pressure to force the de facto government of Honduras to reverse the position it had stubbornly clung to for nearly four months and agree to a deal that could reinstate deposed President Manuel Zelaya.
Source: Afghan election talks falter
Talks between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and election foe Abdullah Abdullah have broken down, a Western source close to the Afghan leadership told CNN.
Video: Afghan Strategy Takes Time
President Obama met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff about troop levels in Afghanistan. As David Martin reports, the military now admits just getting troops there would take a long time.
Researching Dog Health
- Image by Getty Images via Daylife
Last month, my dog Delores got really sick and I was frantic to find a way to get her better. I sought help from many ventinearians and spent hours researching online for any information related to canine health. My dog has been with me for many years and the thought of her being sick made kept me up at night. I was so scared to lose her since she is really my best friend.
Her symptoms were pretty tricky which is why the doctors had a difficult time diagnosing her. In the end after scaring the hell out of me about fears of cancer, and other scary diseases, I myself, came up with the disease she was suffering from just by researching on doggedhealth.com. It turns out that it was a simple stomach infection that mimics other more serious dog diseases. By networking with other pet owners and the doctors on that site, I was able to find out about a diseases my vet had hardly ever heard of.
Thankfully for me and my dog, she is all better now after taking just a simple syrup. And to think that only 2 weeks ago I was thinking of putting her down because I thought she was dying. I have always heard that the internet saves lives but now I know it to be true. My dog, Delores, is alive and healty because of research I found online.
